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EDITORS' CASE NOTE
STATE ENCOURAGED DISCRIMINATION:
MULKEY v. REITMAN (CAL. 1966)
Against a background of national interest in state fair housing
laws and Presidential pressure for Congressional enactment of a
federal law to prohibit private racial discrimination in housing, the
Supreme Court of California in Mulkey v. Reitman' held that article
1 section 26 of the state constitution is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. Enacted as Proposition 142 by an overwhelming majority' of
the voters, article 1 section 26 was immediately attacked in several
cases4 alleging its unconstitutional status. Four editors of the Santa
Clara Lawyer have collaborated to provide an analysis of the reasoning used to support the majority opinion and to raise questions concerning future implications of the decision and its legal reasoning.
In Mulkey, the plaintiff-appellants alleged that they were
Negroes, husband and wife, citizens of the United States and residents of Orange County (California); that the defendants were the
owners and managers of a certain apartment building in Orange
County and that in May 1963' at least one apartment was unoccupied and was being offered for lease to the general public; that the
plaintiffs were being refused the right to rent solely because they
were Negroes; that because of the refusal the plaintiffs were unable
to find a suitable place to live and had suffered humiliation and disappointment; that plaintiffs had no other remedy at law because the
discrimination practiced by the defendants was also practiced by all
the real estate dealers in Orange County. The plaintiffs then prayed
for relief under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.'
1 64 A.C. -,

-

P.2d -,

-

Cal. Rptr. -

(1966).

Unfortunately, none of the

advance sheets had been received at press time so that all quotations and cites are
to the original pages in the court's opinion.
2 General Election, November 3, 1964.
8 As indicated by Justice White in his dissent, the measure was passed by a vote
of 4,526,460 to 2,395,747.
4 Mulkey v. Reitman, L.A. No. 28360 Cal. Supreme Ct. (1965); Hill v. Miller,
Sac. No. 7657 Cal. Supreme Ct. (1965); Peyton v. Barrington Plaza, L.A. No.
28449, Cal. Supreme Ct. (1965); Thomas v. Goulis, S.F. No. 22019, Cal. Supreme Ct.
(1965); Grogan v. Meyer, S.F. No. 22020, Cal. Supreme Ct. (1965); Prendergast v.
Snyder, LA. No. 28422, Cal. Supreme Ct. (1965); Redevelopment Agency of the
City of Fresno v. Buckman, S.F. No. 22017, Cal. Supreme Ct. (1965).
5 Note that the date of the original cause of action was before both the passage
of Proposition 14 and the enactment of the Rumford Act.
6 CAL. Cnv. CODE §§ 51, 52. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 states: "This section shall be
known, and may be cited, as the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
All persons within the jurisdiction of this State are free and equal, and no
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In the trial court the defendants raised the sole defense that
the passage of Proposition 14 had rendered the Unruh Act, upon
which the action was based, null and void. The plaintiffs contended,
unsuccessfully, that Proposition 14 was unconstitutional. It is interesting to note that the only defense raised by defendants was article
1 section 26. One wonders whether there might also have been other
defenses which would not have lead to the constitutional issue." The
decision is also not clear as to whether the plaintiff was seeking
equitable remedies under Civil Code section 51, or money damages
under section 52, or both. If damages were sought, the additional
issue of the retroactive application of Proposition 14 would be raised.
There is no discussion of either suggested defense in the opinions of
the majority or the dissenters.
HISTORICAL LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

In 1959 the California Legislature passed the Unruh Act which
prohibited discrimination by business establishments of every kind
on grounds of race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin. The
act was interpreted by the courts to include real estate brokers as
well as businesses which sold or leased residential housing.' During
the same session, the Hawkins Act 9 was passed which prohibited
racial discrimination in publicly assisted housing. In 1963 the
Hawkins Act was itself superseded by the Rumford Act" ° which
prohibited discrimination by an owner in selling or renting any
private dwelling containing more than four units or by an owneroccupier of a single family, publicly assisted dwelling. The Rumford
Act also declared that discrimination because of race, color or religion
was against California's public policy. To implement this latter act,
the State Fair Employment Practice Commission was given substantial powers including that of forcing the owner to sell or rent to the
matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to
the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in
all business establishments of every kind whatsoever."
CAL. CIr. CODE § 52 states: "Whoever denies, or who aids, or incites such denial,
or whoever makes any discrimination, distinction or restriction on account of color,
race, religion, ancestry, or national origin, contrary to Section 51 of this code, is
liable for each and every such offense for the actual damages, and two hundred
fifty dollars ($250) in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the rights
provided in Section 51 of this code.
7 See Abstract Investment Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 255, 22
Cal. Rptr. 309, 317 (1962). "Clearly, not all persons who rent their property to
others can be held to operate business establishments."
8 See Lee v. O'Hara, 57 Cal. 2d 476, 370 P.2d 371, 20 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1962);
Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609
(1962).
9 Cal. Stat. 1959, c. 1681, p. 4074, 4076, § 1.
10 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-35744.
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aggrieved person if the housing was still available or alternatively
pay damages not to exceed $500.11
The following year, in a highly emotional campaign, marked by
charges and counter-charges, Proposition 14, an initiative measure,
was adopted by the electorate becoming article 1 section 26 of the
California Constitution. In the words of the majority of the court,
Proposition 14 was enacted against the foregoing historical background
with the clear intent to overturn state laws that bore on the right of
private sellers and lessors to discriminate, and to forestall future state
action that might circumscribe this right. In short, Proposition 14
the Rumford and Unruh Acts as they apply to
generally nullifies both
12
the housing market.

The importance of the characterizing of the intent of the electorate
is indicated by comparing the above quotation with the following
statement of the minority,
* . .[T]he measure amounts only to a legislative choice by the people
acting through the power reserved to them by article IV, section 1, of
our California Constitution ... that the state policy which existed in
California prior to 1959 shall be restored; and that there be reserved
to the people the exclusive legislative power to change or modify
this policy. 18

Unfortunately, the basic conflict as to the motive in adopting
Proposition 14 has made well reasoned constitutional guidelines
difficult to discern.
THE QUESTION OF RIGHT
Mulkey holds that article 1 section 26 [hereinafter referred to
as section 26] of the California Constitution violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In reaching this
decision the court reasons as follows:
It is now beyond dispute that the Fourteenth Amendment, through the
equal protection clause, secures, without discrimination on account
of color, race [or] religion, 'the right to acquire and possess property
of every kind'....."among the civil rights intended to be protected
from discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth Amendment are
the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property. Equality in
the enjoyment of property rights was regarded by the framers of that
Amendment as an essential pre-condition to the realization of other
basic civil rights and liberties which the Amendment was intended to
14
guarantee.'
11 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35738.
12 64 A.C. at -, - P.2d at -, - Cal. Rptr. at -. [Court's opinion page 7.]
13 Id. at -P.2d at -Cal. Rptr. at -.
[Dissenting opinion of White,

J.at page 2.]
14 Id. at -,

-

P.2d at

,

Cal. Rptr. at

-.

[Court's opinion at 8, 9.]
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The court finds racial discrimination conceded by the defendants.
Therefore:

5

The only real question thus remaining is whether the discrimination
results solely from the claimed private action or instead results at
least in part from state action which is sufficiently involved to bring
the matter within the proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 6

In answering this question the court finds that the state is sufficiently
involved "to fall within the reach of the constitutional prohibition," 1 7
and in voiding all of section 26 says:
. . . [W]e can conceive of no other purpose for an application of
section 26 aside from authorizing the perpetration of a purported
private discrimination where such authorization or right to discriminate
does not otherwise exist ... 18

After reading this decision one is left with mixed feelings, disregarding any personal bias that may be involved. On one hand, the
decision seems correct in holding that the state cannot discriminate
in its laws on the basis of race, color or religion, and if the state
was doing so in this case then a ruling of unconstitutionality is
correct. On the other hand, one is left with a vague disquiet-one
difficult to pinpoint but present nonetheless, and in an attempt to
dispel the uncertainty examines the court's reasoning.
It appears that the three basic points made by the court in
Mulkey were: (1) there is a right to acquire property free from
racial discrimination by the state; (2) an admitted case of racial
discrimination by an individual existed; and (3) state "involvement" in the discrimination was found. The following discussion
will consider the points in the above order.
As authority for the right to acquire, possess and enjoy property
the court cites four United States Supreme Court cases 9 and two
California Supreme Court cases.20 The right set forth in these cases
is the right to acquire property free from discrimination by the state
because of race, color or religion. Acquire is used in the sense of "to
come into possession" and not in the sense of "to gain for oneself
through one's actions or efforts." This is the first area of confusion
in Mulkey.
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to life, liberty
15
16
17
18

Id. at
Id. at

-,
-,

-

Id. at -,
Id. at -, -

P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d

at -,
Cal. Rptr. at -.
at -,
Cal. Rptr. at -.
at
,
Cal. Rptr. at -.
at -,
Cal. Rptr. at -.

[Court's opinion at 9.]
[Court's opinion at 9, 10.]
[Court's opinion at 10.]
[Court's opinion at 25.]

19 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1947); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U.S. 60 (1917).

20 Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal.

Rptr. 606 (1963); Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
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and property under the Due Process Clause. Without a valid reason,
a state cannot lessen these rights in any way-arbitrary laws are not
permitted. Clearly under modern constitutional principles race is
not a valid factor upon which rights may be determined. Therefore,
any law attempting to make the right to property depend upon this
single factor would be arbitrary and violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process guarantee. The cases cited in Mulkey
are examples.
In Buchanan v. Warley2 ' there was a city ordinance prohibiting
Negroes from moving into white neighborhoods. It was pleaded as a
bar to a contract made by a willing buyer and a willing seller. The
United States Supreme Court held that the state could not enforce
this statute because it was an impermissible interference with the
otherwise valid passage of title. It was impermissible because the
state had no valid reason to interfere with either the buyer's right
to acquire the property or the seller's power of alienation. A similar
2 2 wherein the state
case is Fujii v. California
claimed title to certain
property deeded to the plaintiff. The claim was based on a state
statute which withheld all interests in real property from certain
designated races and nationalities. There also the state was not
permitted to enforce this statute because there was no valid basis
for the interference.
In Shelley v. Kraemer23 an attempt was made by a third person
to enforce a racially restrictive covenant in the seller's deed, and
in Barrows v. Jackson2 4 a suit for damages was brought for breach
of a racially restrictive covenant. In both cases it was held that
because the state had no valid reason to interfere with the passage
of title between the buyer and seller its courts could not be used to
accomplish the interference.
The crux of these decisions is that there is no basis in logic or
reason to determine the extent of state power to lessen rights in
property by looking to the particular means employed to achieve
this end. Therefore, whether there is a statute affirmatively restricting rights in property, or a court so doing, the end result is to
impermissibly lessen the buyer and seller's rights in the property
which is prohibited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
One aspect that Mulkey did not discuss in setting out the right
to acquire property is the existence of a "willing buyer and willing
seller relationship." The court totally ignored the problem of whether
21 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
22 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
334 U.S. 1 (1947).
24 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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this relationship has any effect on the right to come into possession
of property. This appears to be rather an important distinction the
significance of which is not developed in the cases relied upon by
the California Supreme Court. Unlike Mulkey, those cases involved
willing buyers and sellers.
Another problem arises from the cases relied upon by Mulkey
to establish the plaintiffs' rights to acquire property. What right to
property has the state lessened? The cited cases point out that it
doesn't matter which means are employed by the state to reach the
prohibited end. If the state is involved in preventing the passage of
title between a buyer and seller on racial grounds, it is violating the
buyer's right to property.
The court seems to use two theories to show state interference.
First, the court says:
, * .[I]t is established that even where the state can be charged with
conduct, the color of state action
only encouraging discriminatory
25
nevertheless attaches.

The import of this "encouragement" theory is that state action of
this type encourages racial discrimination which curtails the
"buyer's" right to property. The other theory is the "authorization"
theory about which the court says:
[..
[T]he
state, recognizing that it could not perform a direct act of
discrimination, nevertheless has taken affirmative action of a legislative
discriminatory practices
nature designed to make possible private
26
which previously were legally restricted.

In other words, the state has enabled sellers to discriminate.
Neither of these theories show that the state has prevented
the passage of title between the buyer and seller. The court says
that section 26 encourages and permits racial discrimination which
was previously "legally restricted," but the court does not say that
this prevented the passage of title, or that it lessened the buyer's
right to property guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The court is merely saying that the effect
of section 26 is that it lessens the opportunities of minority groups
to acquire property which they could have acquired previously
under state law.
This is one of the areas in which the decision has not come to
grips with the problem presented. First, the court sets out a right
to acquire property but they neither define nor delimit the right.
Second, the court makes no attempt to show that such a right even
25 64 A.C. at -,

26 Id. at -,

-

- P.2d at -, - Cal. Rptr. at -. [Court's opinion at 16.1
P.2d at -, - Cal. Rptr. at -. [Court's opinion at 19, 20.1
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exists in the facts of the case before it. Third, the court does not
establish that the state either directly or indirectly violated this
right. In fact, the court never speaks of the failure of the defendant
to rent his property to the plaintiff except in terms of discrimination.
For these reasons, if Mulkey purports to stand for the proposition
that there is a constitutional right to acquire property it has failed
to support its position legally or logically.
Pointing out the lack of a constitutional right to acquire
property in the sense used by the court makes the decision more
confusing. Disregarding the right to acquire property, the decision
is reduced to two basic points: (1) an admitted act of racial discrimination by an individual; and (2) state involvement in the discrimination which is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. These points are subject to the same
criticism that has been made regarding the right to acquire property,
that is the failure to define or delimit the problem presented.
It is well established that a state may not discriminate against
a particular racial group solely because of their race." But it has
also been pointed out that the Equal Protection Clause does not add
anything to the rights under the Constitution which one citizen has
against another" s and that it is not designed as a safeguard against
the conduct of private persons or individuals. 9 It is not clear why
the court is concerned with finding an admitted act of racial discrimination by the defendant in this case. If the Equal Protection
Clause does not proscribe individual actions how can a finding of
discrimination by the defendant in this case lend any support to a
finding of unconstitutionality?
The court says that section 26:
...provides for nothing more than a purported constitutional right to
privately discriminate .... Thus, as a complete and only answer to
plaintiffs' allegations which irrefutably establish a discriminatory act,
defendants urge that section 26 accords them the right as private
citizens to so discriminate.80
What "purported constitutional right" is being given that has not

previously existed? As Mr. Justice Goldberg stated in Bell v. Maryland:8
Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the constitutional right of every person to close his home.or club to any person

or to choose his social intimates and business partners solely on the
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
29 Iowa-Des Moines Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931).
Cal. Rptr. at -. [Court's opinion at 9.]
80 64 A.C. at -, - P.2d at -,
81 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
27
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basis of personal prejudices including race. These and other rights
pertaining to privacy and private association are themselves constitutionally protected liberties.3 2
It seems that the court in Mulkey is saying that section 26 purports
to give a constitutional right to the defendant, namely a right to
discriminate. But it is not a constitutional right that section 26
purports to give, rather it is the restoration of a right previously
limited by the state. The court seems to recognize this later in the
opinion where it says:
Here the state has affirmatively acted to change its existing laws from
a situation wherein the discrimination practiced was legally restricted

to one wherein it is encouraged, within the meaning of the cited
decisions. 33

It is difficult to conceive how the action of the defendant in
this case can be transformedinto a constitutional evil merely because
the state repeals a fair housing law. Even assuming that the effect of
the repealer is to "encourage," "authorize," "permit," etc., the nature of the defendant's act itself has not been changed. As the dissent
points out:
As I view it, another important issue presented to us is whether
in the several states a person has a right of action under the Fourteenth Amendment to obtain judicial relief against another person who
refuses on grounds of race to deal with him in the sale or leasing of
private residential property. If he has such a right of action, then I
agree that neither section 26, nor any statute, decision of any court,
nor any vote of the electorate can properly deny it.
...I submit the state cannot fairly be held responsible for that
conduct unless it has a duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to
prohibit such conduct, and that a state has that duty only if the
Fourteenth Amendment contains a self-executing cause of action for
34

racial discrimination in private housing.

The editors suggest that the court has been incomplete in its
explanation of the right involved in the case before them and has
in fact failed to designate the precise right which has been violated.
Was it the right conferred by California Civil Code section 51?
Was it a constitutional right to acquire property? Or was it a constitutional right to be free from discrimination?
By speaking in vague terms regarding the rights involved in
the case before them, the court has given at least the implication
that once fair housing legislation is passed it cannot be repealed.
A broader implication that might also be inferred from their holding
32 Id. at 313 (concurring opinion).
83 64 A.C. at -,
- P.2d at -, - Cal. Rptr. at -. [Court's opinion at 20.]
34 Id. at -,
P.2d at ,
Cal. Rptr. at -. [Dissenting opinion of White,

J. at 25-27.]
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is that the state has a duty to protect its citizens from discrimination
in the sale or rental of housing and therefore must enact fair housing
legislation.35
To avoid these unnecessary implications the court should have
been explicit in pointing out that the right to which the plaintiffs
were entitled in this case was the right to be free from discrimination
by the state.3" If the state was significantly involved in achieving
such discrimination, its action violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. What constitutes significant involvement by the state?
STATE ACTION

Adopting the court's statement that the undisputed act of racial
discrimination would clearly violate the Equal Protection Clause if
state action can be found, the key issue becomes the sufficiency of
the state involvement to bring the act within the Fourteenth Amendment proscription. Initially, in its discussion of the state action
problem, the court examines the scope and nature of the necessary
involvement. There is an express rejection of the contention that
inaction by the state could be construed as significant state involvement.
However subtle may be the state conduct which is deemed
"significant," it must nevertheless constitute action rather than inaction.
The equal protection clause and, in fact, the whole of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is prohibitory in nature and we are not prepared to hold,
as has been urged, that it has been or should be construed to impose
upon the state an obligation to take positive action in an area where
37
it is not otherwise committed to act.

In support of the proposition that state action has consistently
been found when the state had lent its processes to the achievement
of discrimination, the court relies on Shelley v. Kraemer."s There,
when a Negro purchased property subject to a racially restrictive
covenant, owners of adjoining property subject to the same covenant
sought to prevent the vendee from occupying the premises and to
have title revested in the vendor. The issue raised by the case was
not the validity of the restrictive covenant itself but the validity
of its enforcement by the state courts. Quoting directly from Shelley,
the court stated:
• . . [T]he Amendment makes void "State action of every kind"
which is inconsistent with the guarantees therein contained, and
85 Ibid.
36 As the Court pointed out in Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1963),
"The vice lies not in the resulting injury but in placing the power of the State
behind a racial classification . . . ." [Emphasis added.]
37 64 A.C. at -, - P.2d at -, - Cal. Rptr. at -. [Court's opinion at 11.]
38 334 U.S. 1 (1947).
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extends to manifestations of "State authority in the shape of laws,
customs, or judicial or executive proceedings." 3 9

In comparing Mulkey with Shelley, the court further said:
Shelley, and the cases which follow it, stand for the proposition that
when one who seeks to discriminate solicits and obtains the aid of the
court in the accomplishment of that discrimination, significant state
action, within the proscription of the equal protection clause, is
involved. The instant case may be distinguished from the Shelley and
the Abstract cases only in that those who would discriminate here are
not seeking [emphasis in original] the aid of the court to that end.
Instead they are in court only because they have been summoned
there by those against whom they seek to discriminate. 40 [Unless
otherwise noted, emphasis added.]

As pointed out by Justice White (dissenting), the majority ignored an important factual distinction between the cases. Shelley involved a willing seller and a willing buyer: enforcement of the
covenant would have compelled the seller to discriminate against his
wishes; such enforcement would have deprived the property owner
of his right to dispose of his property as he sees fit absent a valid
legislative restriction. The instant case involves a situation of a land
owner unwilling to rent his property to a particular individual. This
distinction between willing seller and buyer situations and those
where one party is unwilling was brought out forcefully by Justice
Black's dissent in Bell v. Maryland.4 The following quotation from
Bell, with emphasis added, was used by Justice White in his Mulkey
dissent4" to epitomize his view of section 26.
. .. [T]he line of cases from Buchanan through Shelley establishes
these propositions: (1) When an owner of property is willing to sell
and a would-be purchaser is willing to buy, then the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, which gives all persons the same right to "inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey" property, prohibits a State, whether
through its legislature, executive, or judiciary, from preventing the

sale on the grounds of the race or color of one of the parties. Shelley
v. Kraemer, supra, 334 U.S., at 19. (2) Once a person has become a
property owner, then he acquires all the rights that go with ownership:
"the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person's acquisitions
without control or diminution save by the law of the land." Buchanan
v. Warley, supra, 245 U.S., at 74. This means that the property owner
may, in the absence of a valid statute forbidding it, sell his property
to whom he pleases and admit to that property whom he will; so long
as both parties are willing parties, then the principles stated in
Buchanan and Shelley protect this right. But equally, when one party
is unwilling, as when the property owner chooses not to sell to a
89 64 A.C. at -, - P.2d at -, - Cal. Rptr. at -. [Court's opinion at 12.]
40 Id. at -, P.2d at ,
Cal. Rptr. at -. [Court's opinion at 13.]
41 378 U.S. 226 (1963).
42 64 A.C. at -, - P.2d at -, - Cal. Rptr. at -. [Dissenting opinion of White,

J. at 12, 13.]
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particular person or not to admit that person, then, as this Court
emphasized in Buchanan, he is entitled to rely on the guarantee of due
process of law, that is, "law of the land," to protect his free use and
enjoyment of property and to know that only by valid legislation,
constitutional grant of power, can anyone
passed pursuant to some
43
disturb this free use.

The court in Mulkey does not expressly state that the use of the
state court to defend a private act of discrimination would involve
"significant" state action; however, since the distinctions between
Mulkey and Shelley are minimized, there is a strong implication
that the majority would be willing to so extend the rule of Shelley.
The legal implications of such an extension are far-reaching.
Buchanan recognizes, in the absence of a valid regulatory statute,
a constitutionally protected right of the land owner to use and dispose of his property in whatever manner he wishes. If such a "right"
incorporates the concepts of judicial recognition and enforcement,
any extension of the state action concept to include both offensive
and defensive use of the courts would render what was once a
constitutional right a mere power enforceable only through self help.
There would be no discernible distinction between private action and
state action because the very fact of use of the courts would constitute significant state involvement under the Fourteenth Amendment.
. .. [I]f the distinction between state action and private action is to
have any genuine meaning, the applicability of constitutional limitations
not on the
must hinge on the nature of the private activity itself-and
44
bare presence of state enforcement or adjudication.

Otherwise,
... [I]f the courts in adjudicating rights and relationships between
private persons must hold every private person to the identical
constitutional standards binding on a state, then effectively over eightyfive years of unbroken constitutional rulings go by the board, and
individual action for all practical purposes becomes subject to the
fourteenth amendment. 45
The court in Mulkey then goes on to state,
. .. Shelley is not limited to state involvement only through court
proceedings. In the broader sense the prohibition extends to any
racially discriminatory act accomplished through the significant aid of
any state agency, even where46 the actor is a private citizen motivated
by purely personal interests.
43 378 U.S. 226, 330-31.
44 St. Antoine, Color Blindness

But Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action,
Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MicH. L. Rav. 993,.
1009 (1961).
45 Id. at 1008.
46 64 A.C. at -, - P.2d at -, - Cal. Rptr. at -. [Court's opinion at 13, 14.]
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They cite as case authorities for this proposition, Marsh v. Alabama 7 Nixon v. Condon," and Evans v. Newton. 9
A trespass statute was involved in Marsh where a Jehovah's
witness was arrested while disseminating religious literature on the
sidewalk of a company town. The property consisted of residential
buildings, streets, and a commercial center which was rented out
to merchants and service establishments. The public character of
the commercial center is emphasized in the Court's description.
Intersecting company-owned roads at each end of the business block
lead into a four-lane public highway which runs parallel to the business
block at a distance of thirty feet. There is nothing to stop highway
traffic from coming onto the business block and upon arrival a traveler
may make free use of the facilities available there. In short the town
and its shopping district are accessible to and freely used by the public
in general and there is nothing to distinguish them from any other
town or shopping center except the fact that the title to the property
belongs to a private corporation. 50

The property was posted to the effect that solicitation of any kind
was prohibited without a permit. The appellant was denied a permit
and personally warned not to distribute her literature. She continued
distribution and refused to leave when requested; she was arrested

for violation of a trespass law. Appellant contended that this application of the law to her activities violated her rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The controlling
rationale for the Court's position in Marsh is easily shown by a few
quotes from the opinion.
Our question then narrows down to this: Can those people who live
in or come to Chickasaw be denied freedom of press and religion
simply because a single company has legal title to all the town? 51
The State urges in effect that the corporation's right to control the
inhabitants of Chickasaw is coextensive with the right of a homeowner
to regulate the conduct of his guests. We cannot accept that contention.
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public
in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory
and constitutional rights of those who use it.52
In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the premises
where the deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were held
by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's
permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to
restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such
47 326 U.S. 501 (1945).
48

286 U.S. 73 (1931).

86 Sup. Ct. 486 (1966).
326 U.S. at 503.
51 Id. at 505.
52 Id. at 505, 506.
49
50
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restraint by the application of a state statute. Insofar as the State has
attempted to impose criminal punishment on appellant for undertaking
to distribute religious literature in a company town, its action cannot
stand. 53

It is evident that the court was influenced by the application
of the property in question to public use and was very concerned
about the inhabitants of the company town being denied favored
First Amendment freedoms of "press" and "religion." Nowhere in
Marsh does the court suggest or imply that the result would have
been the same had a single resident or merchant in the company
town requested that the appellant leave his premises. In that situation there would have been no possibility that the individual resident
of the company town would have been denied freedom of the press
or religion. To suggest that Marsh is applicable to the instant situation of a single landowner, whose property is not in any way devoted
to public use, and who is not engaged in an activity that is traditionally governmental in character is to completely ignore the context
and rationale of the Marsh case and to expand the concept of state
action far beyond current precedent.
The next supporting argument used by the court concerns the
"white primary cases," particularly Nixon v. Condon."4 The court
describes Nixon as a situation where a political party was allowed
to prescribe qualifications for membership and concludes, "A local
political party thereafter barred Negroes from voting in its primaries
and it was held that the permissive private action was chargeable
as state action."" The petitioner in Nixon sought damages from election judges for their refusal to allow him to vote in the primary
election. The district court's denial of relief was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court. The following excerpt from the case
gives the historical background and the reasoning of the decision.
This is not the first time that he [petitioner] has found it necessary
to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts in vindication of privileges secured to him by the Federal Constitution.
In Nixon v. Herndon... this court had before it a statute of the
State of Texas . . . whereby the legislature had said that "in no
event shall a negro be eligible to participate in a democratic party
primary election . . . ." At the suit of this petitioner, the statute was
adjudged void as an infringement of his rights and liberties under the
Constitution of the United States. Promptly after the announcement
of that decision, the legislature of Texas enacted a new statute ...
"every political party in this State through its State Executive Committee shall have the power to prescribe the qualifications of its own
members and shall in its own way determine who shall be qualified to
vote or otherwise participate in such political party ...
58 Id. at 509.

54 286 U.S. 73 (1931).
55 64 A.C. at -, - P.2d at

-,

-

Cal. Rptr. at -.

[Court's opinion at 15.]
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Acting under the new statute, the State Executive Committee
of the Democratic party adopted a resolution "that all white democrats
who are qualified under the constitution and laws of Texas and who
subscribe to the statutory pledge .. .and none other, be allowed to
participate in the primary elections. . ...M

While clearly the petitioner was barred from voting at a primary
because of race, the respondents urged that the action was by a
political party and not subject to the constitutional restraint on the
states. The Court answered:
Whatever our conclusion might be if the statute had remitted to the
party the untrammeled power to prescribe the qualifications of its
members, nothing of the kind was done. Instead, the statute lodged
the power in a committee, which excluded the petitioner and others
of his race, not by virtue of any authority delegated by the party, but
by virtue of an authority originating or supposed to originate in the
mandate of the law.57 [Emphasis added.]

After pointing out that a declaration of a will to bar Negroes had
never been made at State Party Conventions, the Court noted:
Whatever power of exclusion has been exercised by the members of
the committee has come to them, therefore, not as the delegates of the
party, but as the delegates of the State. . . .Power so entrenched is
statutory, not inherent. If the State had not conferred it, there would
be hardly color of right to give a basis for its exercise. 58 [Emphasis
added.]

In concluding, the Court held:
The pith of the matter is simply this, that when those agencies are
invested with an authority independent of the will of the association
in whose name they undertake to speak, they become to that extent the
organs of the State itself .... What they do in that relation, they must
do in submission to the mandates of equality and liberty that bind
officials everywhere. They are not acting in matters of merely private
concern like the directors or agents of business corporations. They are
acting in matters of high public interest, matters intimately connected
with the capacity of government to exercise its functions unbrokenly
and smoothly.59 [Emphasis added.]

To rely on Nixon for the proposition that private action infringing
constitutional rights comes under the proscription of the Fourteenth
Amendment when permitted by the state is to grossly oversimplify
the holding of the case. To hold that Nixon is applicable to the instant situation is to ignore the distinction between a grant of a fundamental government power to the State Executive Committee, and
an elimination of a restriction on a land owner to use and dispose
56 286 U.S. at 81.

id. at 84.
58 Id. at 85.
59 Id. at 88.
57
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of his property as he sees fit. The court in Nixon pointed out that
the situation was one of "high public interest" intimately connected
with the function of government. If that rationale is applied to the
situation of sale and rental of private property then any distinction
between private action and state action will be completely obliterated
in the area of property rights.
The third case relied upon in the "traditional governmental
function" argument is Evans v. Newton.6" There, the city of Macon,
Georgia, was trustee of a park dedicated to the city under the terms
of a will designating its use by white persons exclusively. When the
objection was raised that the city could not operate the park in a
segregated manner without violating the Equal Protection Clause,
the city attempted to resign as trustees. The United States Supreme
Court held:
We only hold that where the tradition of municipal control had become
firmly established, we cannot take judicial notice that the mere
substitution of trustees61instantly transferred this park from the public
to the private sector.
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot but conclude
that the public character of this park requires that it be treated as a
Amendpublic institution subject to the command of the Fourteenth
62
ment, regardless of who now has title under state law.

The distinction between the park in the Evans case and the apartment in Mulkey is very apparent from the Court's discussion of the
park in Evans.
This park, however, is in a different posture. For years it was an
integral part of the City of Macon's activities. From the pleadings
we assume it was swept, manicured, watered, patroled, and maintained
by the city as a public facility for whites only, as well as granted tax
exemption under Ga. Code Ann. § 92-201. The momentum it acquired
as a public facility is certainly not dissipated ipso facto by the
appointment of "private" trustees. So far as this record shows, there
has been no change in municipal maintenance and concern over this
facility .

. .

. If the municipality remains entwined in the manage-

ment or control of the park, it remains subject to the restraints of
the Fourteenth Amendment .... 63
This conclusion is buttressed by the nature of the service rendered the community by the park. The service rendered even by a
private park of this character is municipal in nature ....

A park ...

is more like a fire department or police department that traditionally
serves the community. Mass recreation through the use of parks is
plainly in the public domain . . . and state courts that aid private

parties to perform that public function on a segregated basis implicate
64
the State in conduct proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
60 86 Sup. Ct. 486 (1966).

61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.

at 489-90.
at 490.
at 489.
at 490.
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To suggest that the rationale in Evans v. Newton is applicable to a
private apartment such as is involved in Mulkey is to obliterate the
distinction between public and private property.
After reviewing the above cases involving various government
functions the court proceeds to the question of what constitutes
significant involvement.
* . . [I]t is established that even where the state can be charged with

only encouraging discriminatory conduct, the color of state action
nevertheless attaches. 65

The court begins its discussion of the concept of encouragement by
discussing it as a result of state court action; citing Justice Black in
Robinson v. Florida6 and Bell v. Maryland7 and the holding in
Barrows v. Jackson.68
Robinson is a sit-in case wherein appellants were arrested under
a state trespass statute for refusing to leave a lunch counter when
requested. The appeal was from the denial of a motion for a directed
verdict on grounds that their arrest, prosecution, and conviction by
the State on this evidence would amount to state discrimination
against them on account of color, thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause. The opinion of the court by Justice Black stated:
In this case we do not reach the broad question whether the
Fourteenth Amendment of its own force forbids a State to arrest and
prosecute those who, having been asked to leave a restaurant because
of their color, refuse to do so. For here there are additional circumstances which, we think, call for a reversal .... 69
In the present case, when appellants were arrested and tried the
Florida Board of Health had in effect a regulation, adopted under
"authority of the Florida Legislature" and applicable to restaurants,
which provided that "where colored persons are employed or accommodated" separate toilet and lavatory rooms must be provided. A
month before petitioners were arrested, the State of Florida had issued
a "Food and Drink Services" manual, based on state regulations. The
manual said that as a "basic requirement,"-"Separate facilities shall
be provided for each sex and for each race whether employed or served
70
in the establishment."

Speaking of the regulations the court went on to say:
[T]hey certainly embody a state policy putting burdens upon any
[..
restaurant which serves both races, burdens bound to discourage the
serving of the two races together. Of course, state action, of the kind
65

64 A.C. at -,

-

P.2d at

66 378 U.S. 153 (1963).
67 378 U.S. 226 (1963).
68 346 U.S. 249 (1953).

69 378 U.S. at 155.
70 Id. at 156.

-,

-

Cal. Rptr. at -.

[Court's opinion at 16.]
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that falls within the proscription of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, may be brought about through the State's
administrative and regulatory agencies just as through its legislature. . . . [W]e conclude that the State through its regulations has
become involved to such a significant extent in bringing about
restaurant segregation that appellants' trespass convictions must be
held to reflect that state policy and therefore to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. 71 [Emphasis added.]

In view of the specific holding, it would appear to be somewhat of
an exaggeration to state that the crucial state involvement in Robinson was essentially encouragement. There were positive state regulations exerting substantially greater force on private conduct than
does section 26 of the California Constitution. Contrary to the suggestion of the court in Mulkey, it would appear that the state involvement in Robinson was more clearly linked to the regulations
than to the enforcement of the trespass statute by the state courts.
It should be noted that there is another significant distinction between Mulkey and Robinson. The property involved in Robinson,
a lunch counter, was clearly devoted to a general public use.
It can hardly be argued that Justice Black's dissent in Bell v.
Maryland72 is strong authority for the proposition that private racial
discrimination violated the Fourteenth Amendment once the state in
any way discourages integration or instigates or encourages segregation. In Bell the majority of the Supreme Court remanded the case
to the state court in order to determine if the federal issue might be
avoided by application of superseding state legislation. Led by Justice Black the minority were of the view that the court should have
decided the issue of the constitutionality of the application of the
trespass statute. They were of the view that there was no violation
of appellants' constitutional rights. Mr. Justice Black's statement
about instigation and encouragement alluded to by the court is as
follows:
Neither the parties nor the Solicitor General, at least with respect
to Maryland, has been able to find the present existence of any state
law or local ordinance, any state court or administrative ruling, or any
other official state conduct which could possibly have had any coercive
influence on Hooper's racial practices. Yet despite a complete absence
of any sort of proof or even respectable speculation that Maryland in
any way instigated or encouraged Hooper's refusal to serve Negroes,
it is argued at73length that Hooper's practice should be classified as
"state action."

It is difficult, to say the least, to understand how the majority in
Mulkey can consider Bell an example of state encouragement of
discrimination through the processes of state courts.
Id. at 156, 157.
378 U.S. 226, 318 (1963).
73 Id. at 333, 334.
71
72
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The third case cited by the court as an example of state encouragement of discrimination through court processes is Barrows
v. Jackson"' which involved a suit for damages arising from breach
of a restrictive covenant. In Barrows the Supreme Court stated, "If
the State may thus punish respondent for her failure to carry out
her covenant, she is coerced to continue to use her property in a discriminatory manner, which in essence is the purpose of the covenant." 5 [Emphasis added.] Again, the Mulkey majority appears to
be stretching a point by citing Barrows for the proposition that action
of the state courts is encouragement of discrimination which is
violative of the Equal Protection Clause. In the words of the United
States Supreme Court, there is substantially more than encouragement in Barrows, there is coercion! A land owner would be forced
to discriminate against his wishes or suffer damages. The distinction
between the willing seller-willing buyer situation and the situation
in Mulkey involving an unwilling party was discussed above in connection with Shelley v. Kraemer76 and is equally applicable to the
Barrows comparison.
Continuing with its discussion of what is significant state involvement the California Supreme Court cites additional cases for
the proposition that governmental encouragement of private discrimination is proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The first
case referred to is Anderson v. Martin7 7 where the appellants were
Negroes seeking election to the school board. Prior to the election
the appellants had filed suit to enjoin the enforcement of a Louisiana
statute which required that the race of the candidate appear on the
ballot opposite his name. The United States district judge denied
their request for a temporary restraining order; subsequently a
preliminary injunction was also denied. After the election the appellants tried to amend their complaint and sought a permanent injunction against enforcement of the statute. The United States Supreme
Court gave its ruling and the rationale behind it as follows:
It [the case] has to do only with the right of a State to require or
encourage its voters to discriminate upon the grounds of race. In the
abstract, Louisiana imposes no restriction upon anyone's candidacy
nor upon an elector's choice in the casting of his ballot. But by placing
a racial label on a candidate at the most crucial stage in the electoral
process-the instant before the vote is cast-the State furnishes a
vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to operate
against one group because of race and for another. This is true because
by directing the citizens' attention to the single consideration of race
or color, the State indicates that a candidate's race or color is an
74 346 U.S. 249 (1952).
75 Id. at 254.
76 334 U.S. 1 (1947).
77

375 U.S. 399 (1963).
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important-perhaps paramount-consideration in the citizen's choice,
which may decisively influence the citizen to cast his ballot along racial
lines. 78
Nor can the attacked provision be deemed to be reasonably
designed to meet legitimate governmental interests in informing the
electorate as to candidates. We see no relevance in the State's pointing
up the race of the candidate as bearing upon his qualification for office.
Indeed, this factor in itself 79"underscores the purely racial character
and purpose" of the statute.
The vice lies not in the resulting injury but in the placing of the power
of the State behind a racial classification that induces racial prejudice
at the polls. 80

No one would dispute that in Anderson there was encouragement of
racial discrimination in voting. However, where the issue is the
presence of significant state involvement, the question becomes one
of the degree of the involvement, and therefore the distinctions between cases becomes critical. Mulkey may be distinguished from
Anderson in several important respects. In Anderson the state itself
makes an express racial classification upon which the voters may or
may not react: In Mulkey there is no classification, rather, section
26 states that the owner of property shall have absolute discretion
to whom he will sell or rent his property. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Anderson, the racial classification on the
ballot did not serve any legitimate governmental interest, its only
purpose was to make race a factor in the election of public servants.
In Mulkey there are competing interests involved, the interest of
minority groups in finding adequate housing in areas of their choice
and the interest of property owners in maintaining their rights to
acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of their property as they see fit. In
Anderson there is a governmental function involved-voting and elec8
tions. To use the distinction suggested by the majority in Mulkey
between the nature of the function and the identity of the one responsible for its performance, there is no question that the state is
responsible for the rules and regulations concerning the conduct of
elections. But Mulkey involves the rental of a family apartment
which is neither a governmental function, by nature, nor a function
the performance of which is the responsibility of the state.
Citing McCabe v. Atchinson T. & S.F. Ry.,82 the majority opinion notes a statement in the case that denial of equal railroad facilities by private railroad was unconstitutional state action on the
ground that the right to discriminate was authorized by local statute,
78

Id. at 402.

79 Id. at 403.
80 Id. at 402.
81 64 A.C. at -,

P.2d at
82 235 U.S. 151 (1914).

--

-

Cal. Rptr. at -.

[Court's opinion at 16.1
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and said: "The court reasoned that state authorization to discriminate was no less state action than state imposed discrimination. ' 83
In McCabe, the Oklahoma legislature passed an act known as the
Separate Coach Law which provided that railroads doing business in
the state should provide separate facilities for white and Negro passengers which facilities should be equal in comfort and convenience.
Section 7 of the act provided that nothing in the act should be construed to prevent the railroads from hauling facilities for use exclusively by one race. The Negro appellants tried to restrain the railroads from making any distinction in service on account of race, and
then sought to enjoin the railroads from complying with the act alleging among other grounds that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The respondents' demurrer to the complaint was sustained.
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court on the grounds that the
allegations of the bill were too vague and indefinite to warrant the
relief sought. There were no allegations that any of the appellants
had ever travelled on the railroad, nor that any of them had ever
requested or been refused equal accommodations. With respect to
section 7 of the Separate Coach Law the Court said, "It is not questioned that the meaning of this clause is that the carrier may provide
sleeping cars, dining cars and chair cars exclusively for white persons and provide no similar accommodations for negroes."8 4 The railroad argued that this action was necessary because there was not
sufficient demand for such services by Negroes. The Court rejected
that argument.
It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the laws,
and if he is denied by a common carrier, acting in the matter under
the authority of a state law, a facility or convenience in the course of
his journey which under substantially the same circumstances is
furnished to another traveler, he may properly complain that his
constitutional privilege has been invaded.8 5

The importance of factual distinctions as indicated in the prior
discussion of Anderson is equally applicable here. There is no doubt
that the above quoted dictum from McCabe suggests that state
authorization of discrimination is violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. Two important distinctions to be noted between McCabe
and Mulkey are first that McCabe involved a common carrier, property clearly devoted to public use; and second, no legitimate governmental interest is served by allowing the railroad to provide unequal
facilities. As pointed out in the discussion of Anderson there are
legitimate competing interests involved in the Mulkey situation.
The California Supreme Court also cites Burton v. Wilmington
83 64 A.C. at -,

- P.2d at
84 235 U.S. at 161.
85 Id. at 161, 162.

,

Cal. Rptr. at

-.

[Court's opinion at 18.]
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Parking Authority"6 for the proposition that state authorization of
private discrimination is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Burton, the appellant was refused service in the Eagle Coffee
Shoppe, a lessee of the Parking Authority which is an agency of the
State of Delaware. The appellant claimed that the refusal of service
on account of his race abridged his rights under the Equal Protection
Clause. The Supreme Court of Delaware held that the coffee shop
was acting in a "purely private capacity" and therefore no state
action was involved. The decision of the United States Supreme
Court includes a discussion of the extent of state involvement.
Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance. 87
The land and building were publicly owned. As an entity, the
building was dedicated to "public uses" in performance of the
Authority's "essential governmental functions." . . . The costs of land
acquisition, construction, and maintenance are defrayed entirely from
donations by the City of Wilmington, from loans and revenue bonds
and from the proceeds of rentals and parking services out of which
the loans and bonds were payable . . . . [T]he commercially leased
areas were not surplus state property, but constituted a physically and
financially integral and, indeed, indispensable part of the State's plan
to operate its project as a self-sustaining unit. Upkeep and maintenance
of the building, including necessary repairs, were responsibilities of
the Authority and were payable out of public funds. It cannot be
doubted that the peculiar relationship of the restaurant to the parking
facility in which it is located confers on each an incidental variety of
mutual benefits.88
Addition of all these activities, obligations and responsibilities of the
Authority, the benefits mutually conferred, together with the obvious
fact that the restaurant is operated as an integral part of a public
building devoted to a public parking service, indicates that degree of
state participation and involvement in discriminatory action which it
89
was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to condemn.
Specifically defining the limits of our inquiry, what we hold today is
that when a State leases public property in the manner and for the
purpose shown to have been the case here, the proscription of the
Fourteenth Amendment must be complied with by the lessee as
certainly as though they were binding covenants written into the
agreement itself.9°

It would appear that the majority in Mulkey has substantially oversimplified and broadened the scope of the Burton decision beyond
the limitation expressly set by the highest Court in its opinion. In
86 365 U.S. 715 (1960).
87 Id. at 722.
88 Id. at 723, 724.
89 Id. at 724.
90 Id. at 726.
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addition if we "sift facts and weigh circumstances" to measure the
state involvement, it is clear that there was considerably more state
involvement in the Burton situation, in addition to the fact that
there property was devoted to public use.
The California Court next discusses Turner v. City of Memphis9 where a -Negro was refused nonsegregated service in the
Memphis municipal airport restaurant operated by appellee Dobbs
Houses, Inc. as lessee of the city. In discussing the action seeking an
injunction against the discrimination, the California Supreme Court
said:
S..
[A] Tennessee statute renounced the state's common law cause
of action for exclusion from hotel and other public places and declared
that operators of such establishments were free to exclude persons
for any reason whatever. In the particular circumstances of that case
the statute was deemed to bear on the issues "only insofar as" it
"expressed an affirmative state policy fostering segregation." The
court stated that: "our decisions have foreclosed any possible contention that such a statute . . . may stand consistently with the
-92
Fourteenth Amendment ....

In comparing Turner with Mulkey the California court argues that
they are "undeniably analogous," and describes Mulkey as follows:
[T]he state, recognizing that it could not perform a direct act
of discrimination, nevertheless has taken affirmative action of a
legislative nature designed to make possible private discriminatory
practices which previously were legally restricted. . . . Here the state
has affirmatively acted to change its existing laws from a situation
wherein the discrimination practiced was legally restricted to one
wherein it is encouraged, within the meaning of the cited decisions. 93
* . .

This discussion of Mulkey and the court's link to the Turner
case create the implication that it was the change of the law in the
Turner case that was the controlling consideration. The following
statements of the Court in Turner relating the facts and basis of decision suggest that such an implication is not completely accurate.
. . . [A]ppellees' answers, in addition to asserting that the restaurant
was a private enterprise to which the Fourteenth Amendment did not
apply, invoked Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 53-2120, 53-2121, and Regulation
No. R-18 (L). The statutes as now phrased authorize the Division
of Hotel and Restaurant Inspection of the State Department of Conservation to issue "such rules and regulations .. . as may be necessary
pertaining to the safety and/or sanitation of hotels' and restaurants . . ." and make violations of such regulations a misdemeanor.
The regulation, promulgated by the Division, provides that "Restaurants catering to both white and negro patrons should be arranged
91 369 U.S. 350 (1962).
92 64 A.C. at -, - P.2d at -, - Cal. Rptr. at -. [Court's opinion at 19.]
93 Id. at -, - P.2d at -, - Cal. Rptr. at -. [Court's opinion at 19, 20.]
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so that each race is properly segregated. . . ." Dobbs Houses later
amended its answer to include a defense based on Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 62-710. That statute "abrogates" Tennessee's common-law cause
of action for exclusion from hotels or other public places, and declares
establishments are free to exclude persons
that the operators of such 94
"for any reason whatever."
Since, as was conceded by Dobbs Houses at the bar of this Court,
the Dobbs Houses restaurant was subject to the strictures of the
Fourteenth Amendment under Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority . . . the statutes and regulation invoked by appellees could
have furnished a defense to the action only insofar as they expressed
an affirmative state policy fostering segregation in publicly operated
facilities. But our decisions have foreclosed any possible contention
that such a statute or regulation may stand consistently with the
Fourteenth Amendment.9 5

The discussion of the appellees answer indicates that there were
other statutes involved besides the one abrogating the common-law
cause of action for exclusion from public places. It would appear
that the significant point in Turner was the concession that the case
was controlled by Burton, which clearly prohibits discrimination in

service by a lessee of a state owned facility. With respect to the three
statutes and the regulation defensively relied on by the appellees, the
Court in Turner did not decide that the statutes did provide a defense or that they were in fact an expression of an "affirmative state
policy fostering segregation."
The Mulkey court's discussion of the issue of what is significant
state involvement may be summarized briefly as follows: The majority says that state encouragement and state authorization of
private discrimination are significant state actions violative of the
Equal Protection Clause. The discussion above has analyzed the
cited authority for these propositions of law and demonstrated that
there was more than simple encouragement or authorization in the
majority of the cases and in the others, has pointed out the significant factual distinctions between Mulkey and the cases cited. As
applied by this court, there are some very far-reaching implications
in the encouragement and authorization arguments.
Concerning encouragement, the court said:
Here the state has affirmatively acted to change its existing laws from
a situation wherein the discrimination practiced was legally restricted
to one wherein it is encouraged, within the meaning of the cited decisions. Certainly the act of which complaint is made is as much, if
not more, the legislative action which authorized private discrimina96
tion as it is the final private act of discrimination itself.
94 369 U.S. at 351, 352.

95 369 U.S. at 353.

96 64 A.C. at

-,

-

P.2d at

,

Cal. Rptr. at -.

[Court's opinion at 20.]
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The clear import of the above language is that once the state enacts
legislation prohibiting private discrimination, it cannot alter or
repeal that legislation if the impact of such amendment or repeal
would have the effect of encouraging racial discrimination. The
effect of such a rule would be to severely limit the power of the state
to deal with racial problems. The courts would have to examine each
change of legislation even remotely connected with civil rights to
determine if the effect was to encourage racial discrimination. It is
not clear from the court's discussion whether the state action must
be shown to have actually encouraged discrimination in the given
situation or whether instead the possibility or tendency that private
racial discrimination might be encouraged is sufficient to render that
action violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. The latter alternative seems more likely because it would be very difficult to determine
the actual influence of the state's action in a given case. The majority
of the court characterized Proposition 14/section 26 as being "designed to" or for the "purpose" of allowing private racial discrimination and in that sense it encourages and condones such conduct.
There is no doubt that some people who supported the initiative
measure were motivated by racial bias, however, one might seriously
question the validity of the court's ascribing that motive to all or
even the majority of the more than 4,500,000 who voted in favor of
its passage. Clearly there were some who supported the measure
because they objected to the letter and not the spirit of the existing
fair housing legislation. Is a state to be burdened with ineffective,
imperfectly drafted legislation without popular support because a
repeal of such legislation would or might encourage private individuals to discriminate?
The implications of the court's authorization argument are
equally broad and far-reaching. The logical conclusion from the
court's position is that the proscribed authorization will not be
limited to express, statutory examples, but will include authorization
implied by failure to prohibit. The clear import of this argument is
that the state has a positive duty to enact legislation prohibiting
conduct by private individuals that would be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment if carried on by the state: that which the state
does not prohibit it allows or authorizes. Therefore, the end result
of this "authorization" argument is that private conduct would be
governed by the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment,
in spite of the court's express disclaimer of such a proposition.
Concluding its discussion of the state action issue, the court
states:
From the foregoing it is apparent that the state is at least a
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partner in the instant act of discrimination and that9 7its conduct is
not beyond the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The court's failure to more definitely pinpoint their finding of state
action and the analysis of the cited cases has led the editors to suggest that the comment of Justice Harlan in his dissent in Burton is
equally applicable to this case.
The Court's opinion . . .seems ... to leave completely at sea just
what it is in this record that satisfies the requirement of "state
action."98
SEVERABILITY

The court in Mulkey noted the express severability clause of
section 26 and acknowledged that there were possible applications
of the section in which no unconstitutional discrimination would
result. The court recognized that a statute which has unconstitutional applications may still be effective in instances in which the
Constitution is not violated. However, the majority cites a limiting
principle in the recognition of severability.
. . .[W]hen the application of the statute is invalid in certain situations we cannot enforce it in other situations if such enforcement
entails the danger of an uncertain or vague future application of the
99
statute. ....
The court cautions that they must be particularly aware of such
danger when the enforcement of the statute would impinge on the
exercise of constitutional rights or impose criminal sanctions. The
opinion includes a citation to In re Blaney' for the rule that the
language of the statute must be mechanically severable.
We further held in Blaney that a severability clause is ineffective to
sustain valid portions or applications of a statute unless ". . . the
language of the statute is mechanically severable, that is, where the
valid and invalid parts can be separated by paragraph, sentence,
clause, phrase, or even single words," and that where the statute is
not so severable ". . . then11 the void part taints the remainder and the
whole becomes a nullity.''
The court in Mulkey concluded,
It is immediately apparent from the operative portion of the
instant constitutional amendment that it is mechanically impossible
to differentiate between those portions or applications of the amendment which would preserve the right to discriminate on the basis of
64 A.C. at -, - P.2d at -, - Cal. Rptr. at -. [Court's opinion at 22.]
365 U.S. at 728 (dissenting opinion).
99 64 A.C. at -, - P.2d at -, - Cal. Rptr. at -. [Court's opinion at 23.]
100 30 Cal. 2d 643, 184 P.2d 892 (1947).
101 64 A.C. at -, - P.2d at -, - Cal. Rptr. at -. [Court's opinion at 24.]
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race, color or creed, as distinguished from a proper basis for discrimination. The purported preservation of the right to discriminate
on whatever basis is fully integrated and, under the rule of Blaney,
not severable.
. . [[T]he severability clause is ineffective in the instant case,
and the whole of the constitutional amendment must be struck
02
down.
Considering the practical problem which would result from any other
holding, the logic of the court's decision in this aspect of the case
can be clearly understood.
CONCLUSION

Mulkey v. Reitman is an important case because the issues involved are some of the most challenging facing our courts. The editors have endeavored to examine this decision of the California
Supreme Court from the standpoint of its legal reasoning and possible implications. We specifically do not imply any support for or
condemnation of either Proposition 14/article 1 section 26 or the
legislative acts which may have been intended to be affected by its
enactment. Our discussion has been intended as a critical analysis of
the reasoning in the decision itself.
Like many of the recent cases involving racial discrimination,
Mulkey involves a situation in which the principal legal question
is the presence of state action. As a natural result, the major legal
implications and impact of the case will relate to the state action
problem. In the previous United State Supreme Court cases holding
"tprivate" action subject to constitutional limitations, three elements
appear to have been controlling.
• . . (1) the private body was exercising a basic state function, typically with the affirmative cooperation of the state; (2) the private
body was invoking affirmative state action by seeking judicial enforcement of a private contract; or (3) the private body had derived
its power to act in a particular capacity or engage in a specific
activity, usually monopolistic or exclusive, by virtue of a statute,
and was regulated in the exercise of this power by governmental
authority.' 03
Therefore it would appear that Mulkey extends the concept of state
action far beyond the limits of previous case authority. The most
significant implications of the decision flow from the results of the
court's apparent willingness to extend Shelley to include defensive
Id. at -, - P.2d at -, - Cal. Rptr. at -. [Court's opinion at 24, 25.]
St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State
Action, Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MicH. L. REV.
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use of the state courts and the court's argument that state encouragement or authorization of private discrimination, without more, constitutes significant state involvement. The logical results of these
arguments are (1) that the distinction between private and state
action is almost entirely obliterated with the result that conduct
formally considered private is now governed by the Fourteenth
Amendment; (2) that once a state enacts civil rights legislation it
may not amend or repeal that legislation if the effect could tend to
encourage private discrimination; (3) that there is a positive duty
on the state to enact positive anti-discrimination statutes because the
state cannot permit or authorize discrimination. These results suggest that the concept of state action by itself is no longer a useful
tool in evaluating conduct that was traditionally considered private.
If any conduct is to remain outside the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment proscription, the inquiry must be more precise than a
search for state action as presently defined. One factor that should
be considered is the type of private conduct involved. Private racial
discrimination in the choice of one's dinner guests is substantially
different than refusal to serve Negroes in a lunch counter open to
the public; however, if the inquiry is limited to whether such conduct
is permitted or authorized by the state, both discriminatory acts can
be said to involve state action.'
The following test has been proposed as a more precise tool in
determining the limits of applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Has the state permitted, even by inaction, a private party to exercise
such power over matters of a high public interest that to render
meaningful the type of rights protected by the fourteenth amendment the action of the private person or organization must be deemed,
for constitutional purposes, to be the action of the state? 0 5
The editors agree with the author of the proposed test that the real

advantage of such a test is that it focuses the attention of the court
on the "truly significant factor."
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See generally St. Antoine, supra note 103.
105 St. Antoine, supra note 103, at 1011.
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